1.59
“The world is the totality of facts, not of things.”[1]
Instead of facts, let’s say relations (which is, in part, what Wittgenstein is getting at).[2]
But let’s not follow Wittgenstein too closely here, or too quickly.
[1] Wittgenstein, Tractatus, §1.1, p. 5.
[2] Facts are states of affairs (Wittgenstein, Tractatus, §2, p. 5), which are states of things (§2.01, p. 5), i.e., how things are disposed, related, and combined (§2.01). Things are possible constituents of states of affairs (i.e., they combine to be facts) (§2.011, p. 6). Things are always open to relations (§2.0121, p. 6) and stand in determinate relations (§2.031, p. 9). It’s unthinkable that things are not internally related (§4.123, p. 32). In addition, things are the unalterable form that allows for world (§2.022–2.023, p. 7; §2.026, §2.0271, §2.0272, p. 8); so, while there must be things, their configuration is concrete, particular, and variable. All this means that things are always in relations that determine states of affairs and facts, particular things (as distinct from things as unalterable form) are always relational, and the world is this totality of relations.