2.39
When I say that the world offers us feedback (§1.39, §2.38) and that we can sense if our orientation isn’t quite right, I’m restating the idea that things demand attention, not just once, for things are this demanding of attention. Things demand attention because of the dynamism of their relational web (i.e., how they’re situated in our and their world), for various relations tighten and relax, build up and collapse, and are fostered or neglected. Things call because of these differentials (§2.20).
How can things, across worlds, appear in so many ways at once? They appear one way to one group, another to another group, partly because of the differentials situated in relational webs of world. Things appear differently—they are different in different disclosures—because of different world-relations.
That is, enworlded beings have certain possibilities open for them based on certain characteristics. For instance, their particular, bodily, perceptual nature. In each case, the relations that an enworlded being has to being as a whole varies. An enworlded being is related to different kinds of beings, each related to other beings, which inform how beings appear for the enworlded being, and vice versa. Relations include histories. Each world-disclosure is a deep set of metaphysical, ontological relations. — As I’ll show, we don’t need identity at the core of this differential set of relations.
How can things appear in so many, non-convergent ways at once? – Because things are relational.