2.70
But if interpretation changes the world (§2.69), then why quote Marx: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it” (§1.69)?[1] If I’m challenging the dichotomy around which this quote hinges—interpretation vs. change—why use it?
Philosophy often offers ways of interpreting phenomena without noticing it changes the world it’s in. Description is never neutral; it changes the world implicitly, subtly, deceptively, or slyly, or, in strengthening an understanding of the world (e.g., ‘common sense’), it resists change. Yet, even resisting changes the world. There are no positions to which conservatism adds nothing new. — ‘Do I dare disturb the universe?’; do I dare to think that I could not?
Thus, irresponsive description can occlude encounters with things themselves.
Even if one thinks philosophy can change the world, some think philosophy can act only within the world.
So, I’m issuing a call for philosophy that’s cognizant of its power. A call for philosophy that yearns to offer new visions, because the old ones don’t accord with the phenomena. And a call for philosophy that blooms as a kind of practice that cannot be determined in advance.
Philosophy is already a set of practices. Institutionally, philosophy is practiced in specific ways: enacted through bodily postures and activities (e.g., reading alone, conference presentations, coursework, publications, online learning; etc.), within ranges of acceptable tone and style, within institutional structures and facilities tied to an ethics of business and the market, and bound up with discursive practices embedded in power-knowledge relations. However, for reasons that are becoming increasingly clear and pressing, the institutional model and its practices may not be sufficient.
[1] Marx, “Theses On Feuerbach,” in Selected Writings, p. 173.